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Abstract. This work addresses the problem of providing explanation capabili-
ties to an argumentation system. Explanation in defeasible argumentation is an
important, and yet undeveloped ﬁeld in the area. Therefore, we move in this di-
rection by deﬁning a concrete argument system with explanation facilities.
We consider the structures that provide information on the warrant status of
a literal. Our focus is put on argumentation systems based on a dialectical proof
procedure, therefore we study dialectical explanations. Although arguments rep-
resent a form of explanation for a literal, we study the complete set of dialectical
trees that justiﬁes the warrant status of a literal, since this set has proved to be a
useful tool to comprehend, analyze, develop, and debug argumentation systems.
1 Introduction
There has been attention focused on the role of explanations from several areas of Ar-
tiﬁcial Intelligence –especially from the expert systems community [1,2,3]. A few of
them treat explanations in relation with argument systems [4]. In the literature, often
an argument is regarded as an explanation for a certain literal. That is, the claim being
explained is put under discussion, and only then it will be accepted or not. In belief
revision, the role of explanations has also been studied [5]: a new perception is accom-
panied by an explanation, which is used (when needed) to resolve inconsistency with
the agent’s current beliefs. The piece of knowledge having the “best” explanation is the
one that prevails, and is accepted as a new belief.
We areconcernedwiththetypeofexplanationsthatgivethenecessaryinformationto
understand the warrant status of a literal. Since our focus is put on argumentation sys-
tems based on a dialectical proof procedure, we study dialectical explanations (from
now on, δ-Explanations). Although we recognize arguments as an explanation for a lit-
eral, we are interested in obtaining the complete set of dialectical trees that justify the
warrant status of a literal. We show how δ-Explanations can be a useful tool to com-
prehend and analyze the interactions among arguments, and for aiding in the encoding
and debugging of the underlying knowledge base. Several examples, generated with an
implemented system that returns, for a given query, both the answer and the associated
δ-Explanation, are given throughoutthe paper.
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An interesting review about explanations in heuristic expert systems is given in [1],
in which a deﬁnition is given: “...explaining consists in exposing something in such a
w aythatitisunderstandableforthereceiveroftheexplanation–sothathe/sheimproves
his/her knowledge about the object of the explanation– and satisfactory in that it meets
the receiver’s expectations.” In our approach, we explain through exposing the whole
set of dialectical trees related to the queried literal. We believe that this information is
understandablefrom the receiver’s point-of-view,because all the argumentsbuilt, their
statuses (i.e., defeated/undefeated), and their interrelations are explicitly shown. This
type of information would be satisfactory for the receiver, because it contains all the
elements at stake in the dialectical analysis that supports the answer.
An empirical analysis about the impact of different types of explanations in the con-
text of expert systems is given in [2]. The typology there described includes: 1) trace:
a record of the inferential steps that led to the conclusion; 2) justiﬁcation: an explicit
description of the rationale behind each inferential step; 3) strategy: a high-level goal
structure determining the problem-solving strategy used. From this typology, the au-
thors claim that –through their empirical analysis– the most useful type of explanation
is “justiﬁcation”. We contend that the type of explanations we propose correspond to
both the “justiﬁcation” and the “strategy”types; that is, we are giving notonly the strat-
egy used by the system to achieve the conclusion, but also the rationale behind each
argument, which is clearly stated by its role in the dialectical tree.
We agree with [4], in that “argumentation and explanation facilities in knowledge-
base systems should be investigated in conjunction”. Therefore, we propose a type of
explanationthat attempts to ﬁll the gap in the area of explanationsin argumentsystems.
Our approach is to provide a higher-level explanation in a way that the whole context
of a query can be revealed. The examples given in this paper stress this point.
This paper is organized as follows: ﬁrst we will brieﬂy outline the DELP concepts,
then we will introduce δ-Explanations and their relation with DELP’s answers, and
ﬁnally we will discuss the related literature.
2D e L P O v e r v i e w
Defeasible Logic Programming (DELP) combines results of Logic Programming and
Defeasible Argumentation.The system is fully implementedand available online[6]. A
brief explanation is included below (see [7] for full details). It has the declarative capa-
bility of representing weak informationin the form of defeasible rules, and a defeasible
argumentationinference mechanism for warranting the entailed conclusions. A DELP-
program P is a set of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules deﬁned as follows. Facts
are ground literals representing atomic information or the negation of atomic informa-
tion using the strong negation “∼”( e.g., chicken(little) or ∼scared(little)). Strict
Rules represent non-defeasible information and are denoted L0← L1,...,L n,w h e r e
L0 is a ground literal and {Li}i>0 is a set of ground literals (e.g., bird← chicken)
or ∼innocent← guilty). Defeasible Rules represent tentative information and are de-
noted L0 –≺L1,...,L n,w h e r eL0 is a ground literal and {Li}i>0 is a set of ground
literals. (e.g., ∼flies–≺chicken or flies–≺chicken,scared).Dialectical Explanations in Defeasible Argumentation 297
When required, P is denoted (Π,Δ) distinguishing the subset Π of facts and strict
rules, and the subset Δ of defeasible rules (see Example 1). Strong negation is allowed
in the head of rules, and hence may be used to represent contradictory knowledge.
From a program(Π,Δ) contradictoryliterals could be derived.Nevertheless, the set Π
(which is used to represent non-defeasible information) must possess certain internal
coherence. Therefore, no pair of contradictory literals can be derived from Π.
A defeasible rule is used to represent tentative information that may be used if noth-
ing could be posed against it. Observe that strict and defeasible rules are ground. How-
ever, following the usual convention [8], some examples use “schematic rules” with
variables. To distinguish variables, as usual, they start with an uppercase letter.
Example 1. Consider the DELP-program (Π1,Δ1) where:
Π1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(bird(X)← chicken(X)) chicken(little)
chicken(tina) bird(rob)
scared(tina)
⎫
⎬
⎭
Δ1=
⎧
⎨
⎩
flies(X)–≺bird(X)
flies(X)–≺chicken(X),scared(X)
∼flies(X)–≺chicken(X)
⎫
⎬
⎭
This program has three defeasible rules representing tentative information aboutthe
ﬂyingabilityof birdsin general,andaboutregularchickensandscared ones.Italsohas
a strict rule expressing that every chicken is a bird, and three facts: ‘tina’ and ‘little’
are chickens, and ‘tina’ is scared.
From a program is possible to derive contradictory literals, e.g., from (Π1,Δ1) of Ex-
ample1 it is possible to deriveflies(tina)and ∼flies(tina). Forthe treatmentof con-
tradictory knowledge DELP incorporates a defeasible argumentation formalism. This
formalism allows the identiﬁcation of the pieces of knowledge that are in contradiction,
and a dialectical process is used for deciding which information prevails as warranted.
This dialectical process (see below) involves the construction and evaluation of argu-
mentsthat either supportor interfere with the query underanalysis. Once the analysisis
done, the generated arguments will represent an explanation for the query. As we will
shownext,argumentsthatexplainan answerfora givenquerywillbe shownin a partic-
ularwayusingdialecticaltrees.Thedeﬁnitionofdialecticaltreewillbeincludedbelow,
butﬁrst,wewillgiveabriefexplanationofotherrelatedconcepts(forthedetailssee[7]).
Deﬁnition 1 (Argument Structure). Let (Π,Δ) be a DELP-program,  A,L  is an
argument structure for a literal L from (Π,Δ),i fA is the minimal set of defeasible
rules (A⊆Δ), such that: (1) there exists a defeasible derivation for L from Π ∪A , and
(2) the set Π ∪Ais non-contradictory.
Example 2. From the DELP-program (Π1,Δ1) the following arguments can be ob-
tained (due to space restrictions ‘tina’ will be abbreviated to ‘t’ and ‘ﬂies(tina)’to ‘f’):
 A1,f  =  {flies(t)–≺bird(t)},flies(t) 
 A2,∼f  =  {∼flies(t)–≺chicken(t)},∼flies(t) 
 A3,f  =  {flies(t)–≺chicken(t),scared(t)},flies(t) 
In DELP a literal L is warranted if there exists a non-defeated argument A sup-
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considered, i.e., counter-arguments that by some criterion are preferred to  A,L .I ti s
importantto note that in DELP the argumentcomparison criterion is modular and thus,
the most appropriate criterion for the domain that is being represented can be selected.
In the examples in this paper we will use generalized speciﬁcity [9], a criterion that fa-
vorstwoaspectsinanargument:it prefers(1)amorepreciseargument(i.e.,withgreater
information content) or (2) a more concise argument(i.e., with less use of rules). Using
this criterion in Ex. 2  A3,f  is preferred to  A2,∼f  (more precise) and  A2,∼f  is
preferred to  A1,f  (the later use the strict rule bird(X)← chicken(X)).
A defeater D for an argument A can be proper (D is preferred to A)o rblocking
(same strength). Since defeaters are arguments, there may exist defeaters for them, and
defeaters for these defeaters, and so on. Thus, a sequence of arguments called argu-
mentation line is constructed, where each argument defeats its predecessor. To avoid
undesirable sequences, that may represent circular or fallacious argumentation lines, in
DELP anargumentationlinehas to beacceptable,thatis, ithasto beﬁnite,an argument
can not appear twice, and supportingarguments, i.e., in odd positions, (resp. interfering
arguments) have to be not contradictory (see [7]).
Example 3. (Extends Ex. 2) The argument  A2,∼f  is a proper defeater of  A1,f ,
and  A3,f  is a proper defeater of  A2,∼f . Hence, [ A1,f ,  A2,∼f ,  A3,f ] is
an acceptable argumentation line.
Clearly, there can be more than one defeater for a particular argument A. Therefore,
many acceptable argumentation lines could arise from A, leading to a tree structure.
Given an argument A0,h 0 ,adialecticaltree [7] for  A0,h 0 , denotedT ( A0,h 0 ),i s
a tree where every node is an argument. The root of T ( A0,h 0 ) is  A0,h 0 ,a n de v e r y
inner node is a defeater (proper or blocking) of its parent. Leaves correspond to non-
defeated arguments. In a dialectical tree every path from the root to a leaf corresponds
to a differentacceptable argumentationline. Thus, a dialectical tree providesa structure
for considering all the possible acceptable argumentation lines that can be generated
for deciding whether an argument is defeated. We call this tree dialectical because it
represents an exhaustive dialectical analysis for the argumentin its root.
Given a literal h and an argument  A,h  to decide whether a literal h is warranted,
every node in the dialectical tree T ( A,h ) is recursively marked as “D”( defeated)o r
“U”( undefeated),obtaininga marked dialectical tree T ∗( A,h ). Nodesare marked by
a bottom-up procedure that starts marking all leaves in T ∗( A,h ) as “U”s. Then, for
each inner node  B,q  of T ∗( A,h ),( a ) B,q  will be marked as “U” iff every child
of  B,q  is marked as “D”, or (b)  B,q  will be marked as “D” iff it has at least a child
marked as “U”.
Given an argument  A,h  obtained from P, if the root of T ∗( A,h ) is marked as
“U”, then we will say that T ∗( A,h ) warrants h and that h is warranted from P.
In this paper, marked dialectical trees will be depicted as a tree of labelled triangles
where edges denote the defeat relation (in Figure 1 three marked dialectical trees are
shown). A double arrow edge represents a blocking defeat, whereas a single arrow
represents a proper defeat. An argument  A,h  will be depicted as a triangle, where
its upper vertex is labelled with the conclusion h, and the set of defeasible rules A are
associated with the triangle itself. At the right of each node the associated mark (“U”
or “D”) will be shown.Dialectical Explanations in Defeasible Argumentation 299
Example 4. (ExtendsEx.3)Figure1 showsthe markeddialecticaltree forT ∗( A1,f )
(the leftmost tree), which has only one argumentation line. Observe that the argument
 A2,∼f  interfereswith thewarrantof‘ﬂies(tina)’andtheargument A3,f reinstates
 A1,f . The root of T ∗( A1,f ) is marked as “U” and therefore the literal ‘ﬂies(tina)’
is warranted.
3 DeLP Answers and δ-Explanations
Next, we will deﬁne queries, answers and explanations. We will introduce two types
of queries: ground (called DELP-queries) and schematic. For both types of queries we
will deﬁne explanationsand a way to obtainthe correspondinganswer,thatis: YES, NO,
UNDECIDED or UNKNOWN.
Deﬁnition 2 (Queries). A DELP-query is a ground literal that DELP will try to war-
rant.Aquerywithatleastonevariablewillbecalled schematicqueryandwillrepresent
the set of DELP-queries that unify with the schematic one.
The dialectical process for warranting a query involves the construction and evaluation
ofseveralargumentsthateithersupportorinterferewiththequeryunderanalysis.These
generated arguments are connected through the defeat relation and are organized in
dialectical trees. Observe that given a query Q there could exist different arguments
that support Q, and each argument will generate a different dialectical tree. Therefore,
as we will show below, the returned answer for Q will be only ‘the tip of the iceberg’ of
a set of several dialectical trees that have been explored to support the resulting answer.
Thus, to understand why a query has a particular answer, it is essential to consider
which arguments have been generated and what connections exist among them. In
DELP, δ-Explanations for answers will be the set of dialectical trees that have been
explored to obtain a warrant for that query. The deﬁnition for a δ-Explanation for a
DELP-query follows, whereas explanations for schematic queries will be introduced
by the end of this Section.
3.1 δ-Explanations for DELP-Queries
We contend that δ-Explanations are a central part of an argumentation system whose
proofprocedureis based on dialectical trees, because they allow to visualize the reason-
ing carried out by the system, and the supportfor the answer. It is clear that without this
informationat hand it will be very difﬁcult to understand the returned answer. Next, we
will introduce explanations for ground queries. Then, we will generalize explanations
for schematic queries.Given a literal L, the complementwith respectto strongnegation
will be denoted L (i.e., a=∼a and ∼a=a).
Deﬁnition 3 (δ-Explanation).
Let P be a DELP-program and Q a DELP-query. Let  A0,Q ,..., An,Q  be all the
arguments for Q from P, and  B0,Q ,..., Bm,Q  be all the arguments for Q from
P. Then, the explanation for Q in P is the set of marked dialectical trees EP(Q) =
{T ∗( A0,Q ),...,T ∗( An,Q )}∪{ T∗( B0,Q ),...,T ∗( Bm,Q )}.
Now it is possible to deﬁne DELP-answers in terms of their δ-Explanation.300 A.J. Garc´ ıa, N.D. Rotstein, and G.R. Simari
A2
A3
~flies(tina)
flies(tina)
U
D A1
flies(tina)
U
A3
flies(tina)
U A2
~flies(tina)
D
A3
flies(tina)
U
Fig.1. δ-Explanation for flies(tina)
Deﬁnition 4 (DELP-answer). Given a DELP-program P and a DELP-query Q,t h e
answer for Q is either:
YES, if at least one tree in EP(Q) warrants Q.
NO, if at least one tree in EP(Q) warrants Q.
UNDECIDED,i fn ot r e ei nEP(Q) warrants Q nor Q.
UNKNOWN,i f Q is not in the signature of P.
Example 5. (Extends Ex. 4) Figure 1 shows the δ-Explanation for the DELP-query
‘flies(tina)’, where two dialectical trees for ‘flies(tina)’a r em a r k e d“ U”. There-
fore, ‘flies(tina)’ is warranted and the answer is YES. Note that the δ-Explanation of
Figure 1 is also an explanation for query ‘∼flies(tina)’ which answer is NO. Finally,
observe that the answer for ‘walks(tim)’ is UNKNOWN, because it is not in the program
signature.
Remark 1. The explanation for complementary literals will always be the same, since
it is composed by both the trees for the literal and the trees for its complement.
As we will showin the examplesbelow,thesemantics ofthe programsis sensitive to the
addition or deletion of rules and facts. That is, a new fact added to a program can have
a big impact on the number of arguments that can be built from the modiﬁed program.
Taking into account this characteristic and considering the many possible interactions
amongargumentsviathedefeatrelation(thatleadtotheconstructionofdifferentdialec-
tical trees), δ-Explanationsbecome essential for understanding the reasons that support
an answer.
Example 6. Consider the DELP-program (Π6,Δ6):
Π6 = {q,t} Δ6 =
 
(r –≺q)( ∼r –≺q,s)
(r –≺s)( ∼r –≺t)
 
where the following arguments can be built:
 R1,∼r  =  {∼r –≺t},∼r   R 2,r  =  {r –≺q},r 
From this program the answer for the query ‘r’i sUNDECIDED, and Figure 2 shows
its δ-Explanation. Note that, although the literal ‘s’ is in the program signature (in the
body of a rule), there is no supporting argument for it. Therefore, the answer for query
‘s’i sUNDECIDED, and the δ-Explanation is the empty set (i.e., E(Π6
,Δ6
)(s)=∅).
Remark 2. DELP-queries with UNKNOWN answers always have an empty δ-Explana
tion. However, DELP-queries that have UNDECIDED answers may have empty or non-
empty explanations. Finally, DELP-queries with YES or NO answers will always have
a non-empty explanation.Dialectical Explanations in Defeasible Argumentation 301
R2
~r
U
R1
D
r
R1
r
U
R2
D
~r
Fig.2. δ-Explanation E(Π6
,Δ6
)(r)
Example 7 shows how the introduction of a single fact in (Π6,Δ6) makes a signiﬁcant
difference in E(Π6
,Δ6
)(r).
Example 7. (Extends Ex. 6) Consider the DELP-program (Π6 ∪{ s},Δ6) where the
fact ‘s’ is added to the program of Example 6. If we query for ‘r’ again, we get the
answer NO with the δ-Explanation shown in Figure 3. Note that this δ-Explanation
consists now of two more trees than the one in the previous example. This is so because
there are two newly generated arguments:
 R3,r  =  {r –≺s},r   R 4,∼r  =  {∼r –≺q,s},∼r 
It is our contention that, in DELP, the answer for a query can be easily explained by
presenting the user the associated dialectical trees. From this set of trees the answer
becomes thoroughly justiﬁed, and the context of the query is revealed. The following
examples have more elaborated DELP-programs and the δ-Explanations show that a
defeater D for A may attack an inner point of A.
Example 8. Consider the DELP-program (Π8,Δ8):
Δ8 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(a–≺b)( b–≺c)
(∼b–≺d)( d–≺e)
(∼d–≺f,e)( ∼b–≺e)
(a–≺x)( x–≺c)
(∼x–≺e)( a–≺h)
(h–≺f)( ∼h–≺i)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
Π8 = {c,e,f}
where the following arguments can be built:
R1
R2
R4
~r
~r
U
U R4
~r
U
D R3
D
r r
R4
U
~r
R2
R1
r
D
U R4
U
~r ~r
R3
R1
r
D
U R4
U
~r ~r
Fig.3. δ-Explanation E(Π6
∪{s},Δ6
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 B1,b  =  {b–≺c},b   B 2,∼b  =  {∼b–≺e},∼b 
 X1,x  =  {x–≺c},x   X 2,∼x  =  {∼x–≺f},∼x 
 D1,d  =  {d–≺e},d   D 2,∼d  =  {(∼d–≺f,e)},∼d 
 A1,a  =  {(a–≺h),(h–≺f)},a 
From (Π8,Δ8) the answer for ‘a’i sYES, and the answer for ‘∼a’i sNO. As stated
in Remark 1, although both queries have different answers, they both have the same
δ-Explanation, which is depicted in Figure 4. In that ﬁgure, sub-arguments are repre-
sented as smaller triangles contained in the triangle which corresponds to the main
argument at issue. For instance, the argument  B2,∼b  defeats  B1,b  that is a subar-
gument of  {(a–≺b),(b–≺c)},a .
Example 9. Consider the DELP-program (Π8 ∪{ i},Δ8) where the fact ‘i’ is added
to the program of Example 8. Now the argument  H2,∼h  can be generated which is a
defeater for  H1,h  (a subargument of  A1,a ):
 H2,∼h  =  {∼h–≺i},∼h   H 1,h  =  {h–≺f},h 
Here, argument H2 blocks argument H1 (subargument of A1), leaving no undefeated
arguments for ‘a’; then, the answer for both ‘a’ and ‘∼a’i sUNDECIDED. The rest of
the explanation remains the same as the one in Figure 4.
From the DELP programmer point-of-view, δ-Explanations give a global idea of the
interactions among arguments within the context of a query. This is an essential de-
bugging tool when programming: if unexpected behaviour arises, the programmer can
check the given explanations to detect errors.
In the previous examples we have not shown an explanation associated with a query
with an UNKNOWN answer, because this type of answers have an empty δ-Explanation.
Finally, observe that queries that do not correspond to the intended domain of the pro-
gram will return the answer UNKNOWN. This will capture errors like querying for “ﬂy”
instead of “ﬂies”, or a query like “penguin(X)” in Example 1.
3.2 Explanations for Schematic Queries
A schematic query is a querythat has at least one variable (see Deﬁnition 2), and hence,
it represents the set of DELP-queries that unify with it. Now, we will extend the deﬁni-
tion of δ-Explanation to include schematic queries. Consider again the DELP-program
A1
U
a
B1
D1
b
a
D
D2
~d
U
D
B2
U
~b ~b

d

X1
X2
~x
U
D x
a

Fig.4. δ-Explanation E(Π8
,Δ8
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of Example 1, the schematic query flies(X) has actually inﬁnite terms that unify with
variable X. However, all queries with terms that are not in the program signature will
produce an UNKNOWN answer and therefore an empty explanation. Thus, the set of in-
stances of a schematic query that will be considered for generating an explanation will
refer only to those instances of DELP-queries that contain constants from the program
signature. An explanation for a schematic query will be the set of δ-Explanations of
those instances whose answers are YES, NO,o rUNDECIDED.
Deﬁnition 5 (Generalized δ-Explanation).
Let P be a DELP-program and Q a schematic query. Let {Q1,...,Q z} be all the
instances of Q so that their DELP-answer is different from UNKNOWN.L e tEP(Qi)
be the δ-Explanation for the DELP-query Qi (1 ≤ i ≤ z) from program P. Then, the
generalized δ-Explanation for Q in P is EP(Q) = {E P(Q1), ..., EP(Qz)}.
Observe that a δ-Explanation (Deﬁnition 3) is a particular case of a Generalized δ-
Explanation, where the set EP(Q) is a singleton.
Example 10. Consideragainthe DELP-program(Π1,Δ1), andsupposethatwewant
to know if from this program it can be warranted that a certain individual does not ﬂy.
If we query for ∼flies(X), the answer is YES, because there is a warranted instance:
∼flies(little). The supporting argument is (‘little’ was abbreviated to ‘l’):
 B1,∼flies(l)  =  {∼flies(l)–≺chicken(l)},∼flies(l) 
The trees of the generalized explanation are shown in Figure 5. This explanation also
shows that the other instance (∼flies(tina)) is not warranted.
It is important to note that the answer for the schematic query flies(X) is also YES,
but with a different set of warranted instances: flies(tina) and flies(rob). The sup-
porting argument for instance ‘X = tina’ was already discussed, and the undefeated
argument for instance ‘X = rob’i s :
 C1,flies(rob)  =  {flies(rob)–≺bird(rob)},flies(rob) 
The generalized δ-Explanation for flies(X) is the same as the one for ∼flies(X),
depicted in Figure 5 (see Remark 1).
Deﬁnition 6 (DELP-answer for a schematic query). Given a DELP-program P and
a schematic query Q, the answer for Q is
B2
~flies(little)
U C1
flies(rob)
U A2
A3
~flies(tina)
flies(tina)
U
D A1
A2
A3
~flies(tina)
flies(tina)
flies(tina)
U
U
D
A3
flies(tina)
U
B2
~flies(little)
U
B1
flies(little)
D
Fig.5. Generalized δ-Explanation for ‘∼flies(X)’304 A.J. Garc´ ıa, N.D. Rotstein, and G.R. Simari
– YES, if there exists an instance Qi of Q such that at least one tree in EP(Qi)
warrants Qi.
– NO, if for every instance Qi of Q that is in the signature of P, there is no tree in
EP(Qi) that warrants Qi, and there exists an instance Qi of Q such that at least
one tree in EP(Qi) warrants Qi.
– UNDECIDED, if for every instance Qi of Q that is in the signature of P, there is no
tree in EP(Qi) that warrants Qi nor Qi.
– UNKNOWN, if there is no instance Qi of Q such that Qi is in the signature of P.
Observe that Deﬁnition 4 is a particular case of the previous deﬁnition, where there is a
single instance of Q.
Example 11. Consider the following DELP-program:
Π11 =
 
adult(peter) adult(annie)
unemployed(peter) student(annie)
 
Δ11 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
has a car(X)–≺adult(X)
∼has a car(X)–≺unemployed(X)
∼has a car(X)–≺student(X)
⎫
⎬
⎭
where the followingargumentscanbe built(‘has a car’ wasreplacedby ‘car’, ‘annie’
by ‘a’, and ‘peter’b y‘ p’):
 A1,car(a)  =  {car(a)–≺adult(a)},car(a) 
 A2,∼car(a)  =  {∼car(a)–≺student(a)},∼car(a) 
 P1,car(p)  =  {car(p)–≺adult(p)},car(p) 
 P2,∼car(p)  =  {∼car(p)–≺unemployed(p)},∼car(p) 
When querying for ‘has a car(X)’, variable ‘X’ uniﬁes with both ‘annie’ and
‘peter’.Then, DELPbuildsargumentsforbothinstances:A1 andA2 for ‘X = annie’,
and P1 and P2 for ‘X = peter’. From Figure 6, it is clear that no argument is unde-
feated, i.e., there is no tree that warrants ‘has a car(X)’, for either of the two in-
stances. Therefore, the answer is UNDECIDED, and the variable remains unbound.
Schematic queries give us the possibility of asking more general questions than ground
queries. Now we are not asking whether a certain piece of knowledge can be believed,
but we are asking if there exists an instance of that piece of knowledge (related to an
individual) that can be warranted in the system. This could lead to deeper reasoning as
we may pose a query,gather the warranted instances and continue reasoning with those
individuals.
P1
P2
~car(peter)
U
D
car(peter)
P2
P1
car(peter)
U
D
~car(peter)
A1
A2
~car(annie)
U
D
car(annie)
A2
A1
car(annie)
U
D
~car(annie)
Fig.6. Generalized δ-Explanation for ‘has a car(X)’Dialectical Explanations in Defeasible Argumentation 305
The δ-Explanationssystem receives a DELP-program P, a query Q and an argument
comparison criterion C, and returns a δ-Explanation EX along with the proper answer
ANS. The system is described by the following algorithm in a Prolog-like notation:
d_Explanations(P,C,Q,EX,ANS):- warrants(P,C,Q,WSQ),
complement(Q,NQ), warrants(P,C,NQ,WSNQ),
get_trees(WSQ,WSNQ,EX), get_answer(Q,WSQ,WSNQ,ANS).
warrants(Q,WS):- findall((Q,TREES),warrant(Q,TREES),WS).
get_answer(_,WSQ,WSNQ,yes):- WSQ \= [].
get_answer(_,WSQ,WSNQ,no):- WSNQ \= [].
get_answer(Q,_,_,unknown):- not_in_signature(Q).
get_answer(_,_,_,undecided).
Predicate warrant/2 takes a query and attempts to warrant it; it does so by building
dialectical trees. In case the query is warranted, the dialectical trees built are ‘saved’
along with the query. Different instances of a query can be obtained via backtracking.
Predicate warrants/2 takes a query Q and returns all its warranted instances (along
with their corresponding trees) within a list. Predicate get trees/3 retrieves the di-
alectical trees information from the warranted instances for both Q and ∼Q. Finally,
predicate get answer/4 takes the query, both lists of warranted instances (for Q and
∼Q), and returns the answer.
The above described system is fully implemented and offers support for queries,
answers and explanations. Explanations are written into an XML ﬁle, which is parsed
byavisualizationapplet.Thevisualizationoftreesbelongingtodialecticalexplanations
is enhanced by allowing the user to zoom-in/out, implode/explode arguments, etc.T h e
internal structure of an argument is hidden when imploding, and a unique tag is shown
instead.
Lemma 1 (δ-Explanation Soundness). Let P be a DELP-program, C an argument
comparisoncriterion, and Q a schematic query posed to P.L e tE be the δ-Explanation
returned in support of the answer A.T h e nE justiﬁes (Deﬁnition 6) A.
Lemma 2 (δ-Explanation Completeness). Let P be a DELP-program, C an argu-
ment comparison criterion, and Q a schematic query posed to P.L e tE be the δ-
Explanation returned in support of the answer A.T h e nE contains all the possible
justiﬁcations (Deﬁnition 6) for any instance of A.
4 Related Work
A very thorough survey relating explanation and argumentation capabilities can be
found in [4]. Although the authors are mainly concerned about negotiation/persuasion,
and interactive/collaborative explanations, the discussion Section of that article poses
really interesting issues about the integration of explanation and argumentation;for in-
stance, whether the same knowledge base can be used to generate both explanatoryand
argumentative information. In our approach, we do extract all the information from the
given knowledge base (i.e.,t h eD ELP-program) to return both kinds of information.306 A.J. Garc´ ıa, N.D. Rotstein, and G.R. Simari
In [4], the authors claim that these two areas (i.e., argumentation and explanation
facilities in knowledge-base systems) should be “investigated in conjunction”. Our pa-
per tries to move forward in that direction, providing means to “better understand the
mechanisms underlying the activities of explanation and argumentation”.
Recently, Douglas Walton [10] has offered a dialogue theory of explanation. In that
work a successful explanation is deﬁned as transfer of understanding in a dialogue
system where a questioner and a respondent take part. The questioner begins by asking
a question seeking to understand some piece of information and the respondent gives
a reply that conveys understanding of that information to the questioner. His approach
follows a different path than ours, focussing in the distinction between explanation and
argument and deﬁning an explanation as a new speech act.
Our approach handles δ-Explanations within argumentation systems through a
graphical representation of dialectical trees. Visualization in argumentation has been
addressed in [11]. In that paper, the objective is to provide a visual tool that does not
require the reader to understand logic to be able to follow the argumentative process
shown by the system. To achieve this, they use an animated argumentation space: ar-
guments are introduced one by one in the process to allow for a more comprehensive
visualization. They also allow to see this space in a static manner. Both ways give
the user the possibility to navigate the space at will, or in auto-pilot mode. Every ele-
ment taking part of the argumentation process is represented graphically: conﬂicts are
highlighted and arguments are tagged with the role they are playing in the whole pro-
cess.
AlthoughthearticlebySchroederusesargumentationtreesinasimilarwayaswedo,
we focus on explanations; that is, we are concerned with providing the whole context
corresponding to the query. Our explanations are represented in such a way that they
are useful to both humans and software agents.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Future work includes further research about additional informationthat can be attached
to the current form of the δ-Explanations. In particular, we are currently formalizing
the notion of discarded arguments. These arguments are discarded by the system in the
sense that their introduction into an acceptable argumentationline renders it fallacious.
At the moment, we have singled out two reasons for an argument A to be discarded:
(1) Non-attacking arguments: when A conﬂicts with the last argument in the line, but
does not attack it (i.e., the last argumentis better than A wrt. the comparison criterion);
(2) Double-blocking arguments: when the ﬁnal argument in the line An is a blocking
defeater of the precedingargumentAn−1,a n dA is, in turn, a blocking defeater for An.
More dialectical constraints can be considered thus adding more types of discarded
arguments. It is interesting to show discarded arguments within a δ-Explanation, be-
cause the user has the possibility of analyzing why a particular argument has not been
included into the explanation. Sometimes, it is not clear why these situations occur.
We have addressed the problem, not often considered, of providing explanation ca-
pabilities to an argumentation system. We have deﬁned a concrete argument system
with explanation facilities. We consider the structures that provide information on theDialectical Explanations in Defeasible Argumentation 307
warrant status of a literal. As the system has been implemented, we are developing
applications that uses the δ-Explanation system as subsystem.
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